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NOTE
STAKEHOLDER UNREST,
DENOMINATIONAL THEOLOGY, AND
ECONOMIC VERACITY:
WHY THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MAXIMIZATION NORM SHOULD
REMAIN UNCHANGED
ANDREW R. Roopt

Business is a noble Christian vocation, a work of social justice,
and the single greatest institutional hope of the poor of the
world, if the poor are to move up out of poverty.'
I.

POTHOLES ON WALL STREET

In the early twenty-first century, a few significant scandals
rocked Wall Street and rattled the cages of American investors,
calling into question the integrity of some publicly traded
companies. 2 At the forefront of these scandals was the notorious
Enron debacle, which has come to exemplify an unpleasant
juncture that investors hope will never repeat. The examination
of Enron's fall and other similar scandals has brought renewed
relevancy to certain fields of discussion, including law,
economics, ethics, and religion. 3 Of specific interest to this Note
t J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2004,
DePaul University. With sincere gratitude, I dedicate this Note to those who have
strongly influenced my seven years at Vincentian universities by teaching me that
an authentic desire to understand life's wondrous complexities is the greatest tool
for addressing complicated problems. Your names are too numerous to count and
your impact, immeasurable.
I Michael Novak, A Philosophy of Economics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 791, 791
(2004).
2 See Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion To Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 845 n.16 (2004) (citing major corporations that lost
significant market value due to financial misstatements or questionable business
practices).
3 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1423
(responding to Professor Green's belief that a new corporate legal framework is
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are questions that implicate more than one of these categories.
For instance, is the current directorial and managerial obligation

to maximize shareholder value the correct legal approach? Are
the pertinent teachings of the Christian religion compatible with
this value maximization norm?
This Note will present various stances with regard to these
questions, and ultimately opine that the shareholder value
maximization norm should remain unchanged. Part II will
demonstrate the problem of "corporate unrest" through the eyes
of shareholders and stakeholders by using the notorious Enron
collapse. 4 Part III will discuss one perspective of Christian
teaching as it applies to the topics of humanity and wealth, two
of the elements implicated in this discussion of shareholder value
maximization principles. 5 Next, Part IV will enumerate the
value maximization norm itself, as set forth in the famous case,
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.6 Part V will present some contrasting

denominational analyses of Christianity's compatibility with the
norm.7 Finally, Part VI will conclude with the assertion that,
regardless of the denominational viewpoint adopted, the law as it
exists today is compatible with the Christian doctrinal analysis
presented in this Note and is the best approach for preserving
the integrity of the market and benefiting society as a whole.8
This Note takes for granted that corporations are generally
beneficial to society and contribute tremendously to economic
growth, efficiency, and prosperity. It does not allege problems or
propose solutions to specific issues associated with corporate
unrest, nor does it directly critique decision-making from a
management perspective. Instead, this Note asserts that the
shareholder value maximization norm is compatible with
Christian teaching from a theological perspective and opines that
required, and advocating preservation of the traditional shareholder value
maximization norm); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing
Metaphors of CorporateGovernance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993) (arguing to
set aside the current corporate duty to maximize shareholder value in favor of a new
duty that advocates decision-making through a framework that involves interplay
between legal duties and moral considerations); Stabile, supra note 2, at 839
(making a case for involving religion in the discussion of corporate ethics and reform
as an alternative to purely isolated rationalism).
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 See discussion infra Part III.
6 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
8 See discussion infra Part VI.
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the norm remains the best way to ensure both shareholder and
stakeholder well-being. The Enron story that unfolds in the
following pages is by no means representative or encompassing of
the many issues corporations, directors, officers, shareholders, or
stakeholders face; it is intended to show why everyone should
care about this policy discussion in a major way.
II.

THE FALL FROM GRACE: ENRON IMPLODES

In October of 2001, just one month after the world watched
the symbols of capitalism fall from the sky over Lower
Manhattan, Wall Street took a major hit when Enron publicly
announced a $544 million after-tax charge against its earnings
and a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholders' equity. 9 This was
the beginning of the end for the company. Over the next several
months, investors and creditors would learn that the energy
giant was a "house of cards." The shell game was soon exposed:
special purpose entities and phantom hedges had allowed one of
America's most prominent companies to conceal massive fraud.
A.

Illegitimate Special PurposeEntities

Corporations have employed "special purpose entities" to
achieve many ends. Among the more common purposes is the
securitization of income-generating assets. 10 From an accounting
perspective, many special purpose entities are significant
because they can be removed from the consolidated financial
statements." This structure can be advantageous to companies
because public financial statements, which influence investor
decisions, are unaffected by financial fluctuations within the
special purpose entity. The trade-off is that the corporation
employing the entity must transfer a material amount of risk and
control from the company to independent outsiders-those who
do not have a financial interest in the overall company-in order
to prevent abuse of the structure. 12 To ensure risk transfer,
9 David Millon, Who "Caused"the EnronDebacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309,
317 (2003).
10 See id. at 316.

11 See id. at 316-17. A financial statement is a "written record of the financial
status of an individual, association, or business organization. The financial
statement includes a balance sheet and an income statement ... and may also
include a statement of changes in working capital and net worth." JACK P.
FRIEDMAN, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS 258 (3d ed. 2000).
12 Millon, supra note 9, at 316.
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accounting rules require that independent outsiders foot at least
three percent of the entity's capital. 13 Failure to observe this
imperative requirement results in the automatic collapse of
"special purpose" status, denial of transaction recognition
between the corporation and the special purpose entity, and
forced consolidation 14 of the entity into the corporation's public
15
financial statements.
Enron created hundreds of special purpose entities in order
to accomplish a range of questionable objectives. 16 For example,
the company engaged in transfers with entities that disguised
loans as prepaid commodities trades. 7
This accounting
maneuver allowed Enron to conceal liabilities from its balance
8
sheet and maintain its investment-grade credit rating.'
Additionally, Enron failed to meet the three percent outside
capital requirement on some of the entities. 19 Public disclosure of
these facts began a downward spiral that led the company to file
for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.20 The investigation report
revealed, "the transactions lacked genuine economic substance
and instead 'apparently were designed to accomplish favorable
financial statement results, not to achieve bona fide economic
objectives or transfer risk.' ",21
B.

Phantom Hedges
Hedging contracts serve as a method for eliminating risk. In
13 Id.

14 Consolidation is the effect achieved by consolidated financial statements,
which are "financial statement[s] that bringo together all assets, liabilities, and

other operating accounts of a parent company and its subsidiaries." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 11, at 134. Special purpose entities, if maintained properly, serve the
purpose of avoiding some of this effect.
15 Millon, supra note 9, at 316-17.
16 Id.
17

at 316.

Id.

1 Id. A major factor in credit rating is the degree of liabilities assumed by an
entity. KENNETH M. MORRIS & VIRGINIA B. MORRIS, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING 89 (1999). Therefore, a lower level
of liability is preferable to a company trying to achieve a high-level credit rating. Id.
Excessive liabilities or financial losses resulting from deteriorating financial
condition may lead to a bond rating downgrade, which will force the company to pay
higher interest rates on new issues. Id.
19 Millon, supra note 9, at 317.
20

Id.

21

Id.

(quoting WILLIAM C. POWERS JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY

THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON

CORP. 4 (2002), available at 2002 WL 198018).
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one ideal example, a company will purchase put options from an
independent hedger. Often, these put options are associated with
corporation holdings of stocks in other companies. The put
options give the corporation the right to sell the investment
stocks at a specified price if they lose value, thereby minimizing
losses for the seller.2 2 Hedging contracts typically involve full
transfer of risk to an independent and financially self-sufficient
23
third party.
Enron created special purpose entities to act as hedgers
against its own "merchant equity portfolio," which contained
stocks in other companies. 24 Enron then funded the hedging
contracts with its own stock, so there was no real transfer of risk
to the hedger. 25 Essentially, "Enron was hedging risk with
itself."26 It appears that Enron ideally intended the following
scenario: if investments in other companies fell in value, the
special purpose entity would purchase the stock with capital
raised by Enron holdings. This would prevent Enron from
having to recognize substantial losses in its merchant equity
portfolio on its own consolidated financial statements. Enron did
not prepare for the possibility that its own share value might
decline, which would undermine the hedger's ability to raise
capital to honor the put options. Therefore, when Enron's stock
value did fall, the special purpose entity was unable to execute
its hedging contracts, forcing Enron to recognize the loss of some
of its merchant equity portfolio on its own consolidated financial
27
statements.
C.

Deferred Compensation Bank Run

Enron utilized a deferred compensation plan that allowed
employees to place up to thirty percent of salaries and one28
hundred percent of bonuses in a "trust" held by the corporation.
The tax advantage of this arrangement was a payout at
retirement, when employees would be in a lower tax bracket. 29
22 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 553.
23 Millon, supra note 9, at 318.
24 Id. at 317.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 318 (citing POWERS, supra note 21, at 97).
27 Id.; see also supra note 18 (explaining the relationship between financial loss
and bond rating).
28 Eric Berger, The Fall of Enron, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 4, 2002, at Al.
29 Id. The United States utilizes a progressive tax scheme in which the "rate
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In October 1997, Enron modified a rule such that members of

some of its deferred compensation plans could, in exchange for a
ten percent penalty, cash-in early.30 According to one source,
"Many retirees didn't know about this opt-out clause ....,,31 A

few dozen individuals used this clause to cash-in prior to the
bankruptcy proceedings and retrieve at least $32 million. 32 The
Houston Chronicle reported the age of nearly three-quarters of
the 180 members in the deferred compensation plan was sixty
and over. 33 Most of these employees' requests for early
withdrawal were denied. Consequently, they assumed the status
of unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings, meaning
34
that they are likely to be paid "cents on the dollar, if anything."
D. The GreaterIssue: Everyone Is Affected

The Enron story adds flesh to the issue of stakeholder unrest
and vividly demonstrates the two concerned classes in the
shareholder value maximization debate:
shareholders and
stakeholders. Shareholders own stock in a corporation, while
stakeholders represent a broader group comprised of everyone
who is affected by the company, including employees, suppliers,
customers, and communities.35
Although the decisions of
managers influence all stakeholders, management owes its
primary legal duty to the shareholders. Any argument for or
against the shareholder value maximization norm must be made
with the full realization that such policy decisions will affect the
vast majority of Americans-and many citizens of the worldbecause the number of stakeholders in American corporations is
immeasurable. This begs the question: Is shareholder value
maximization sufficient, or should the law introduce a duty to
stakeholders? Adding a religious component to the discussion
further complicates an already difficult inquiry.
increases as the amount subject to tax increases, thereby taxing the wealthy at a
higher rate than the poor or middle class." FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 543.
Therefore, most retirees with fixed income are subject to a lower tax rate than when
they were receiving income from employment.
30 Berger, supra note 28.
31 Id.
32

Id.

33 Id.

Id.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder
Debate, 4 VILL. J. L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 3 (2002).
34
35
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III. THE FAITH: CHRISTIAN TEACHINGS ON
HUMANITY AND WEALTH

In order to examine the shareholder value maximization
norm and its compatibility with the Christian religion, it is
necessary to highlight some pertinent Christian teachings that
might contribute to the discussion. Specifically, this Note will
focus on teachings about humanity and wealth and will assert
that Christianity endorses (1) a concern for all of humanity, and
(2) a fiduciary "stewardship" attitude toward wealth, which can
include the pursuit of profits.
A.

Humanity

Christianity advocates a love for humankind. The type of
care that characterizes the religion is one that goes beyond basic
concern about others. It entails actively helping others in need to
the same degree that people help themselves. 36 This concept is
summarized in the "Golden Rule," when Jesus says, "Do to others
whatever you would have them do to you. This is the law and the
prophets." 37 While, for Christians, there is a clear distinction
between God and humanity,38 loving God is inseparable from

36 C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 129 (1952) ("[L]ove, in the Christian sense,
does not mean an emotion. It is a state not of the feelings but of the will; that state
of the will which we have naturally about ourselves, and must learn to have about
other people.").
37 Matthew 7:12 (New American); LEWIS, supra note 36, at 131 ("But whenever
we do good to another self, just because it is a self, made (like us) by God, and
desiring its own happiness as we desire ours, we shall have learned to love it a little
more ....").
38 Christians do not accept Pantheism, which asserts that divinity is present in
nature. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 567 (1999).
Instead, they draw a sharp distinction between God, who is perfect actualization,
and nature, which is deprived and therefore imperfect. St. Thomas Aquinas
explained God's distinct perfection in terms of infinity:
[T]he infinity predicated of God indicates supreme perfection in
Him.... Imperfection occurs in a thing for the reason that matter is found
in a state of privation. On the other hand, perfection comes exclusively
from form. Consequently, since God is infinite because He is exclusively
form or act and has no admixture of matter or potentiality, His infinity
pertains to His supreme perfection.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS'S SHORTER SuMMA 22-23 (1993). Aquinas also spoke
of God's perfection in terms of his "simple" attribution. Adopting Aristotelian logic,
God's pure actualization, lacking any withheld potentiality, is what makes Divinity
the uncorrupted "first mover," which is not a complex composite of potential and act,
but the composing element itself, a pure element of form. See id. at 14-15.
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loving humanity. 39
Jesus's
demonstrates this concept:

account of the Judgment best

Then he will say to those on his left, "Depart from me ... [flor I
was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you
gave me no drink, a stranger and you gave me no welcome,
naked and you gave me no clothing, ill and in prison, and you
did not care for me." Then they will answer and say, "Lord,
when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or
ill or in prison, and not minister to your needs?" He will answer
them, "Amen, I say to you, what you did not do for one of these
' 40
least ones, you did not do for me.

Christianity values concern for others because of God's
unique relationship with humankind. The Christian professes
that human beings are made in God's image. 41 This likeness
includes the ability to reason on a level exceeding that of the rest
of creation. 42 Indeed, human beings can even contemplate
mysterious concepts, such as death and eternity.
Christianity also professes that sin, or imperfection, has led
to a separation between God and humanity that creation alone
cannot bridge. 43 This rift is a result of the interplay between
human imperfection and God's perfectly just nature; human
beings, in their unholy form, cannot subsist in communion with a
39 See Stabile, supra note 2, at 850 ("It is for this reason that, from a Christian
perspective, there is no distinction between loving God and loving others.").
40 Matthew 25:41-45.
41 GENESIS 1:26-27 ('CThen God said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness....' God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him;
male and female he created them.").
42 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 407 (1950) ("God, then, made man in His
own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so
that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so
gifted.").
43 This state of degeneration is commonly referred to as "original sin,"
enumerated by St. Augustine. See id. at 413-14.
Wherefore we must say that the first men were indeed so created, that if
they had not sinned, they would not have experienced any kind of death;
but that, having become sinners, they were so punished with death, that
whatsoever sprang from their stock should also be punished with the same
death. For nothing else could be born of them than that which they
themselves had been. Their nature was deteriorated in proportion to the
greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as
punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in
their children.
Id.; see also JOHN CALVIN, THE INSTITUTES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION 85 (1986)
(asserting that it was through the fall of the first man that the entire human race
has "degenerated from its original state").
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perfect God. 44 The Trinity, however, is simultaneously just and
merciful. 45 Christians believe humanity is incapable of selfperfection, and that God sent the Son, the second person of the
Trinity, to reveal ultimate truth to creation and be the supreme
redemption-so that divine justice could be satisfied and
46
humankind may enjoy communion with God.
This basic depiction of the relationship between God and
humankind has a very important implication for the Christian's
view of humanity: all of humanity was separated from God, so
all people are subject to God's justice. 47 Christians are called to
care for others, adherents and non-adherents alike, out of a belief
that all of humankind needs God's mercy, and such mercy
manifests itself in both the spiritual and physical realms. 48 In
other words, the default state of all humankind is one which
lacks entitlement to God's providence. Despite this, God gave
44 In terms of Aquinas' Aristotelian approach, the perfectly simple cannot
coexist beside the corrupted composite. The simple is perfect because it is the
composer. See supra note 38.
45 Psalm 94:22-23 ("No, the Lord is my secure height, my God, the rock where I
find refuge, Who will turn back their evil upon them and destroy them for their
wickedness. Surely the Lord our God will destroy them!"); 1 John 4:16 ("God is love,
and whoever remains in love remains in God and God in him.").
46 John 3:16 ("For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that
everyone who believes in him might not perish but might have eternal life."). The
Christian confesses not that God's judging character was taken away by Christ, but
that God's judgment is satisfied by the work of Christ; in other words, for a
Christian, Christ provided a way for humankind to survive God's still-present
judgment.
47 Romans 3:23 ("[A]ll have sinned and are deprived of the glory of God.").
Because everyone who sins lacks some level of righteousness, and "[j]udgment
will... be founded on righteousness... ," Psalm 94:15, Christians hold that God's
judgment applies to everyone.
48 While grace certainly includes the spiritual, it is far more encompassing. For
an individual to understand grace, it must manifest itself in the physical and
spiritual realms.
Knowing God involves knowing His world for several reasons.... [W]e
know God by means of the world. All of God's revelation comes through
creaturely means, whether events, prophets, Scripture, or merely the
human eye or ear. Thus we cannot know anything about God without
knowing something about the world at the same time.
JOHN M. FRAME, THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 64 (1987). Indeed,
Christianity makes it clear that those who have received Gods grace are to perform
"good works." J.I. PACKER, KNOWING GOD 137 (1973) (Americanized ed. 1993);
Ephesians 2:10 ("For we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus for the good
works that God has prepared in advance, that we should live in them."); Titus 2:1112 ("For the grace of God has appeared, saving all and training us to reject godless
ways and worldly desires and to live temperately, justly, and devoutly in this
age .... ").
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humanity grace. 49 Therefore, the only proper Christian response
50
is to view all people as equally in need of grace and goodness.
Consequently, there is no Christian excuse for neglecting
humanity, because doing so would assert that it is acceptable to
withhold some aspect of undeserved, yet actual righteousness
from humankind, and this view is incompatible with Christian
scriptures. 51 As a result of this general concern for humankind,
many Christians will argue that policymakers should consider
the impact of policies on all people. To be clear, however, this
perspective on policymaking is not unique to Christianity.
B.

Wealth
From an economic viewpoint, money is nothing more than a
highly alienable store of value. 52 One can exchange this medium
to fulfill needs and wants. 53 Money is not inherently good or bad,
but Christian teaching warns adherents to guard their hearts
54
against greed.
Greed is essentially "the love of money." 55 The Christian
religion's aversion to greed is a result of the view of humanity
explicated above. 56 Since all of humanity is undeserving of God's
goodness, then goodness received, including personal financial
fortune, is only to be viewed as a blessing. 57
Therefore,
See John 3:16.
See Romans 3:23.
51 See supra note 48. Christians are taught that the standard for personal
conduct is not human goodness, but God's perfection. WARREN MATTHEWS, WORLD
RELIGIONS 332 (3d ed. 1999).
52 Money was adopted as the primary method of trade to overcome the double
coincidence of wants. For example, under the barter system, a person with extra
animal skins but not enough grain could exchange his surplus skins with another
person who had plenty of food but no skins. MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 18, at 4.
Searching for someone who has what one wants and wants what one has is both
time-consuming and costly. This double coincidence of wants was largely eliminated
with the introduction of currency, which created a method to store value in a more
alienable and divisible medium.
49
50

53 See id.
54 1 Timothy

6:10 ("For the love of money is the root of all evils, and some people
in their desire for it have strayed from the faith and have pierced themselves with
many pains.").
55 See id.
56 See discussion supra Part III.A.
57 The Christian view of blessing and wealth is demonstrated in a warning in
Deuteronomy:
Be careful not to forget the Lord, your God, by neglecting his
commandments and decrees and statutes which I enjoin on you today: lest,
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Christianity teaches that individual personal wealth is a blessing
from God that is "held in trust."5 8 The Christian understanding
of personal wealth is more akin to a trustee's fiduciary
relationship than proprietary ownership. 59
The idea that
Christians hold God's wealth in trust is called "stewardship" and
60
is viewed as a faithful responsibility.
The concept of financial accountability to a master also
applies where an individual is entrusted with the money of
another person. If an investor entrusts funds to a steward for
the purpose of earning profits, that steward is vigorously to
pursue profits on the master's behalf. 6 1 Greed, not profit, is what
receives condemnation under Christian teaching. Profits are
good because they "make possible the investments that ensure
the future of a business and they guarantee employment." 62
The "Parable of the Talents" has been used to demonstrate
the positive attribution of profits. 63
In this parable, three
servants are given assets from their master. Two of these
servants use the assets productively causing the values to
increase. The third servant digs a hole and buries the assets,
earning nothing-not even interest. 64 The master praises the
first two servants, but punishes the third when he returns with
no additional value, calling him "wicked" and "lazy."65 The
master additionally asks, "Should you not then have put my
when you have eaten your fill, and have built fine houses and lived in them,
and have increased your herds and flocks, your silver and gold, and all your
property, you then become haughty of heart and unmindful of the Lord,
your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, that place of
slavery .... Otherwise, you might say to yourselves, "It is my own power
and the strength of my own hand that has obtained for me this wealth."
Remember then, it is the Lord, your God, who gives you the power to
acquire wealth ....
Deuteronomy 8:11-14, 17-18.
58 See Psalm 50:10-12 ("For every animal of the forest is mine, beasts by the
thousands on my mountains. I know every bird of the heavens; the creatures of the
field belong to me. Were I hungry, I would not tell you, for mine is the world and all
that fills it.").
59 See id.
60 1 Corinthians4:2 ("Now it is of course required of stewards that they be found
trustworthy.").
61 See Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 12.
62 Id. (citing UNITED STATES CATHOLIC

CATHOLIC CHURCH 2432 (2d ed. 1997)).
63 See, e.g., id. at 11-12.
64 Matthew 25:14-27.
65 Matthew 25:20-26.

CONFERENCE,

CATECHISM OF THE
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money in the bank so that I could have got it back with interest
on my return?" 66 Due to the demonstrable inefficiency of the
third servant, the master takes the stagnant assets away from
67
him and gives them to one of the productive servants.
This parable has a major implication: a valid Christian
position on money must comport with the scripture's assertion
that those entrusted with the property of others have an
obligation to manage in the best interests of the owner. In this
specific scriptural example, managing for the best interests of the
owner meant earning profits.
Furthermore, profit-seeking
stewardship is not intrinsically "greedy," because Christian
scripture simultaneously endorses accountability to owners and
speaks against greed.
Having touched upon the concepts of humanity and money,
some important doctrinal aspects implicated in discussing the
shareholder value maximization norm, this Note will now explore
the norm itself, as set forth in the benchmark case Dodge v. Ford
68
Motor Co.
IV. THE LAW: A SINGLE EMINENT OBLIGATION

In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., brothers John and Horace Dodge
brought a shareholder suit claiming that the directors of Henry
Ford's extraordinarily successful Ford Motor Company neglected
to fulfill their legal duty to maximize shareholder value. 69 The
holding of this case left nothing to the imagination: the liability
of corporate directors hinges upon whether they make business
70
decisions in the best interests of shareholders.
The Ford Motor Company was an industrial giant, an
extreme example of commercial success, and not necessarily the
predictable target of a corporate value maximization suit.71 As a
66 Matthew 25:27.

67 See Matthew 25:28 ("Now then! Take the talent from him and give it to the
one with ten.").
8 170 N.W 668 (Mich. 1919).
69 Specifically, the Dodge brothers claimed that Henry Ford, who effectively
controlled the board, had decided not to declare any more special dividends on
shares held by the plaintiffs, and instead reinvest some of the profits back into the
company while holding the rest indefinitely. Id. at 671.
70 See infra text accompanying note 99.
71 The extraordinary success of the Ford Motor Company is demonstrated in its
sales growth over a short period. Car sales by volume were 18,664 cars in 1910,
34,466 cars in 1911, 68,544 cars in 1912, 168,304 cars in 1913, 248,307 cars in 1914,
and 264,351 cars in the ten months ending July 31, 1915. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670.
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result of its incredible fortune, the company had paid out a total
of $41 million in "special dividends" in addition to its regular
monthly dividends of five percent of the total value of its
outstanding capital stock. 72
The company had numerous
shareholders and several directors, but the influential parties to
the action were John and Horace Dodge, who together owned ten
percent of the company, and Henry Ford, who effectively
73
controlled the board with fifty-eight percent of the stock.
According to the Dodge brothers, Henry Ford declared that
"the settled policy of the company [was] not to pay in the future
any special dividends, but to put back into the business for the
future all of the earnings of the company, other than the regular
dividend of five per cent ... monthly . . . ."74 The legal problem
with this initiative was not necessarily the decision itself, but its
underlying considerations. Ford was going to invest part of the
retained earnings in plant expansion and other capital
improvements.7 5 A great deal more of the retained earnings,
however, were to sit within the company indefinitely, as Ford
pursued his ambition of employing as many people as possible in
order to help them build lives for themselves.7 6 The Dodge
brothers took issue with these proposed uses of retained
earnings, arguing that the additional social motive was a breach
of director duty and the plant expansion was a pretext for
furthering this improper motive. 77
Total profits over this same period were $4.5 million in 1910, $6.3 million in 1911,
$13.1 million in 1912, $25 million in 1913, $30.3 million in 1914, and $24.6 million

in 1915. Id. Furthermore, as of July 31, 1916, the corporation had a low debt-toequity ratio with approximately $18 million in liabilities against total equity of
about $114 million. Id.
72 Id. Five percent monthly dividends on $2 million in capital stock amount to
monthly total payments of $100,000, with $58,000 going to Henry Ford and $10,000
going to the Dodge brothers. The total "special dividends" for the period 1911-15
were as follows: December 13, 1911, $1 million; May 15, 1912, $2 million; July 11,
1912, $2 million; June 16, 1913, $10 million; May 14, 1914, $2 million; June 12,
1914, $2 million; July 6, 1914, $2 million; July 23, 1914, $2 million; August 23, 1914,
$3 million; May 28, 1915, $10 million; October 13, 1915, $5 million. This amounts to
a total of $41 million in special dividends. Id.
73 Id. at 670-71.
74 Id. at 671.
75 The estimates presented at board meetings summarized the expected costs of

capital improvements as approximately $26.5 million. See id. at 674.
76 See id. at 671.
77 Id. at 678 ("The proposed scheme of expansion is not for the financial
advantage of the corporation, either mediate or immediate, and is not to be
prosecuted with that intent, but for the purpose of increasing the number of
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The plaintiffs believed that Henry Ford's primary motivation
for withholding special dividends was not the maximization of
shareholder value. 78 Instead, they alleged that he intended to
use the dividends to satisfy his motivations of hiring more
employees and placing automobiles in as many households as
possible. 79 The brothers asserted that, while Henry Ford's
proposed ends of employment expansion and purchaser
enablement were worthy in themselves, they fell outside the
scope of his powers as a corporate director because the purpose of
a corporation is to serve the primary end of profits.8 0 The Dodge
brothers proposed that philanthropic ends, "if prosecuted, should
be by individuals associated for such purposes."8'
The lower court in this case took a different approach than
the Michigan Supreme Court would on the subsequent appeal,
but the distinction between approaches sheds additional light on
how courts analyze director and manager decisions. The lower
court enjoined Ford from plant expansion and ordered special
dividends paid within thirty days.8 2
It also restricted the
company from excessively withholding liquid assets at any time

employes [sic] and of the cars produced, to the end of giving employment and lowpriced cars to a greater number of people."). To support their claim further, the
plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate that Ford was opposed to policies that would
require discharging a substantial number of employees, even where such a strategy
would be financially beneficial for the company. Id. at 676-77. Ford responded to the
allegations by stating that he believed minimizing employee discharges would
"ultimately redound to the best financial interests of the company and its
stockholders." Id. at 677.
78 See id. at 678 (explaining that the proposed scheme of expansion was not for
the "financial advantage" of the corporation, either short-term or otherwise). The
plaintiffs argued, "[Tlhe company has no right to use the company's earnings in the
continued extension of the plants and property of the company-indeed, from our
point of view, they have already exceeded their authority in this direction." Id. at
672.
79 See id. at 671, 678.
80 See id. at 678.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 677 ("[It is decreed that within 30 days from the entry [of this decree]
the directors of the Ford Motor Company declare a dividend upon all of the shares of
stock in an amount equivalent to one-half of, and payable out of, the accumulated
cash surplus of said Ford Motor Company .... ). The lower court took drastic
measures to ensure that the smelting plant would never be built. Id. ("The owning,
holding or operating.., of, and the using or appropriating or incurring obligations
which might require or necessitate the using or appropriating of any funds or other
property of said defendant ... for a smelting plant or blast furnace ... is without
authority of law and is permanently and absolutely restrained and enjoined.").
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in the future.8 3 When the case reached the Michigan Supreme
Court, Judge Ostrander used the opportunity to affirm two of the
most vital aspects of corporate law: (1) the business-judgment
rule and (2) the duty to maximize shareholder value.
A.

The Business-Judgment Rule

As demonstrated in Dodge, courts prefer not to interfere with
a company's business decisions, and will only intervene in
specific cases. 8 4 For the Dodge Court, these instances included
fraud, misappropriation of corporate funds, or refusal to declare
dividends when the corporation has a surplus of net profits which
could be distributed without detriment to the business, and
failure to distribute would be, at the very least, in bad faith.8 5
The court's overall policy of noninterference in corporate
matters manifests itself in a rule of law known as "businessjudgment." The business-judgment rule is a judicial presumption
that corporate directors make decisions "on an informed basis, in
good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the
corporation's best interest."8 6 The legal effect of businessjudgment shields directors and officers from liability for decisions
that adversely affect the company, as long as the "transactions
were made in good faith, with due care, and within the directors'
or officers' authority."8 7 Judge Ostrander expressed one practical
purpose of this rule when he declared, "[J]udges are not business
88
experts."

83 Id.
at 678 ("The holding of liquid assets ... in excess of such as may be
reasonably required in the proper conduct and carrying on of the business and
operations of said corporation ...is... without authority of law and is permanently
and absolutely restrained and enjoined ...").
84 See id. at 682 (explaining that courts of equity will not interfere with director
decisions except under very specific circumstances). The court explains that it is a
"well-recognized principle of law" that the power to declare the timing and amount of
dividends rests solely with the directors of a corporation. Id.
85 Id. (citing Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 134 (Mich. 1890)). A
modern court would probably not interfere with decisions regarding dividend payout.
86 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 81 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
87

Id.

Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. Indeed, subjecting every business decision to judicial
review based on results in hindsight could potentially lead to untold director liability
extending even to informed decisions with unfortunate outcomes. See id. (further
explaining the courts reasoning that "plans must often be made for a long future, for
expected competition, for a continuing as well as an immediately profitable
venture").
88

210

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:195

The Michigan Supreme Court applied the business-judgment
rule to the issue of plant expansion, and reversed the lower
court's enjoinder of development.8 9 The court held that the
directors of Ford Motor Company had the discretion to pursue
whatever they resolved as "necessary or judicious for repairs or
improvements, and to meet contingencies both present and
prospective. And their determination in respect of these matters,
if made in good faith and for honest ends, though the result may
show that it was injudicious, is final, and not subject to judicial
revision."90
Business-judgment shielding is only applied to those
decisions that are within the directors' or officers' authority. 9 1
Because directors are bound by the paramount duty of
shareholder value maximization, they do not have the authority
to make decisions that fail to comport with this duty. Therefore,
the court in Dodge believed that plant expansion could
potentially contribute to the maximization of shareholder value,
but it felt much differently about Ford's indefinite withholding of
special dividends.
The Shareholder Value Maximization Norm
The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the lower court's
decision to force payment of special dividends to all Ford Motor
Company shareholders because it saw the accumulation of
excessive reserves as a usurpation of the duty to maximize

B.

89 Id. at 685.
90 Id. at 682 (quoting Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 3 A. 162, 165 (N.J. Eq.
1885), affrd, 19 A. 621 (N.J. Eq. 1888)). The court endorsed reasonable expansion as
a necessary use of income, explaining:
There have been many attempts to sustain such a [shareholder] suit, yet,
although the courts do not disclaim jurisdiction, they have quite uniformly
refused to interfere. The discretion of the directors will not be interfered
with by the courts, unless there has been bad faith, willful neglect, or abuse
of discretion.
Accordingly, the directors may, in the fair exercise of their discretion,
invest profits to extend and develop the business, and a reasonable use of
the profits to provide additional facilities for the business cannot be
objected to or enjoined by the stockholders.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING
A CAPITAL STOCK § 545 (8th ed. 1923)).

91 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (explaining that business-judgment rule
shielding only applies in cases where directors and officers are acting within their
given authority).
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shareholder value. 92 Judge Ostrander explained, "[In this case,]
a refusal to declare and pay further dividends appears to be not
an exercise of discretion on the part of the directors, but an
arbitrary refusal to do what the circumstances required to be
done." 93 The directors' decision to withhold special dividends did
not receive the benefit of the business-judgment rule because
their motivation was not the maximization of shareholder value.
Henry Ford lost because his ambition was "to employ still more
men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and
their homes," and he intended to accomplish this by "putting the
greatest share of

. .

.profits back in the business." 94 The court

commented that Henry Ford's testimony inadvertently gave the
impression that he thought Ford Motor Company had made "too
95

much money."
"These cases . . . turn finally upon the point, the question,

whether it appears that the directors were not acting for the best
interests of the corporation." 96 Counsel for Ford argued that,
although the principal business of a manufacturing corporation is
not humanitarian works, incidental philanthropic outcomes
resulting from the main business of the corporation are not
contrary to law. 97 The court did not dispute this assertion, but
found that Ford's charitable motives were not merely
incidental. 98 The court explained why the business-judgment
rule could not apply to Ford's special dividends decision by
92 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685. Note that modern courts would be likely to defer to
managerial discretion in almost any decision regarding dividend payout. See, e.g.,
Gabelli & Co., Inc. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984) ("[Under
Delaware law,] the declaration and payment of a dividend rests in the discretion of
the corporation's board of directors in the exercise of its business
judgment; ... before the courts will interfere ....fraud or gross abuse of discretion
must be shown."). The underlying analysis of the shareholder value maximization
norm, however, remains the same.
93 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
94 Id. The court described the Ford Motor Company as one of the largest and
most profitable businesses in the world, one that "employs many men, at good pay."
Id.

95 Id. at 683-84.
9 Id. at 684.
97 See id.
93 The court gave an example of "incidental" versus "primary" motives of
philanthropy, respectively, by distinguishing between an expenditure of corporate
funds to build a hospital in order to benefit employees and a more general plan to
"benefit mankind at the expense of others." Id.

212

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:195

enumerating the shareholder value maximization norm in the
context of this case:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes. 99
V.

THE DENOMINATIONAL DEBATE: ORIGINAL SIN AND
ECONOMIC INTERSECTION

It is clear that the shareholder value maximization norm as
the exclusive consideration for business decisions is the best way
to safeguard shareholder interests. Abstractly, Enron's phantom
hedges and misused special purpose entities were the result of
management's failure to comply fully with this norm.
Shareholder value cannot maintain or increase over an extended
period of time with illusions underlying the shares because the
present value of a stock is based upon the expected future
gains. 100 The discussion, however, becomes more complicated
when additional stakeholders and a Christian analysis are
incorporated.
There are two major stances regarding the reconcilability of
the Christian religion with the shareholder value maximization
norm. The distinction between the two is drawn largely along
denominational lines, and is the result of fundamental
differences between Protestant and Catholic understandings of
original sin.
A.

The ProtestantPosition

The Protestant tradition has typically held that maximum
efficiency and the common good of society are both naturally
achieved through each economic agent's adherence to its own
conception of profit maximization. 1 0o Protestant theology posits
99 Id.
100 Peter

Koslowski, The Shareholder Value Principle and the Purpose of the
Firm, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS FROM
THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION 105 (S.A. Cortright & Michael J. Naughton eds.,
2002).
101 Id. at 123.
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that original sin10 2 so corrupted humanity, that individuals are
incapable of purely intending the common good. 10 3 In fact, the
most extreme interpretation of the effects of original sin is found
in the doctrines of mainstream Protestant denominations and is
particularly strong in the Lutheran10 4 and Calvinist 10 5 traditions.
Protestants profess that Christian scriptures support this
1 06
position.
A common Protestant interpretation of the interplay between
original sin, the shareholder value maximization norm, and
common good is as follows: because of humanity's imperfect
intentions derived from natural corruption, the common good is
best reached by the direction of the "invisible hand," which can
accomplish social ends beyond individuals' own selfish
intentions.' 0 7 In other words, maximum common good, in the
context of this discussion, is achieved as an indirect purpose of
the pursuit of profits. 0 8 Adam Smith, the famed economist,
articulated the concept of the "invisible hand" in The Wealth of
Nations:
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring
the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123.
104 Martin Luther proclaimed, "Scripture describes man as corrupted and led
captive, and, furthermore, as proudly disdaining to notice, and failing to recognise,
102
103

his own corruption and captivity ....

MARTIN LUTHER, THE BONDAGE OF THE WILL

153 (1525) (J.I. Packer & O.R. Johnston trans., 1957). The German translation of the
Augsburg Confession, a component of the Lutheran Book of Concord, states that
from the fall of humankind, all people are born in "sin," which means they are "full
of evil lust and inclinations from their mothers' wombs and are unable by nature to
have true fear of God and true faith in God." THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE
CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 29 (Theodore G. Tappert
trans., ed., 1959).
105 The Westminster Confession of Faith, announcing the doctrine of Calvinist
Presbyterianism, states:
From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled,
and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all
actual transgressions. This corruption of nature, during this life, doth
remain in those that are regenerated ....
THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH 7-8 (1990).
106 See, e.g., Romans 8:7 ("For the concern of the flesh is hostility toward God; it
does not submit to the law of God, nor can it .... "); Ecclesiastes 7:20 ("[Y]et there is
no man on earth so just as to do good and never sin."); Genesis 8:21 ("[T]he desires of
man's heart are evil from the start.").
107 See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123.
108 Id.
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only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it. I have never known much good done by those
who affected to trade for the public good. 10 9
Many Protestants will argue that indirect pursuit of social
well-being via the shareholder value maximization norm is the
best approach because the common good resulting from the
pursuit of profits will quantitatively outweigh social benefits
intentionally pursued. 110 Therefore, even from a perspective that
prizes human prosperity as the ultimate end, many Protestants
will defend the norm.
C.

The CatholicPosition
The Catholic tradition has historically viewed the "indirect
purpose" approach to achieving common good as inferior.
Although both Catholics and Protestants hold that humankind is
tainted with original sin, the implications are different for the
denominations.1 1 1
The Catholic tradition holds that despite
original sin, human beings are nonetheless capable of directly
intending and thereby effectuating good through the use of
institutional structures. 1 2 Therefore, Catholic social thought, as
well as the Catechism itself, endorses a multipurpose motivation
in which directors and managers place broader purposes of the
firm alongside, or even ahead of, the purpose of shareholder
value maximization.'1 3 Catholic social teaching asserts that
directors and officers should consider the interests of all
stakeholders when making decisions. 1 4 One goal is internal109 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 351-52 (1991).

110 See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123.
111 Id.
112

Id.

113 Id.

at 123-24. The Catechism of the Catholic Church mandates, "those
responsible for business enterprises are responsible to society for the economic and
ecological effects of their operations. They have an obligation to consider the good of
persons and not only the increase of profits." Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 13 (citing
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
2432 (2d ed. 1997)).
114 See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123-24.
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ization of negative externalities 11 5 by firms, which means that
companies and consumers absorb the full economic charge of
corporate actions and avert distribution of these costs to society
at large.
For Catholics, the Protestant "indirect purpose" approach is
inferior because it accomplishes social good without intending it,
whereas the traditional Catholic approach both intends and
accomplishes well-being of others. 116 As a result, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops called for "economic justice"
through which "all corporate constituents participate in firm
decisions."117
Catholic social thinkers recognize that although institutions
can better society, human beings still reserve a natural proclivity
to value self-interest above all else. 118
However, unlike
assertions in Protestant thinking, people are not "enslaved" to
their self-interest. 119 From a traditional Catholic perspective, it
is logical for people to intend good and to achieve good directly by
acting on these intentions, so the direct approach is the most
effective way to benefit society.
VI. WHY THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION NORM
SHOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED

Given that shareholder interests are best protected by the
value maximization norm, the real debate surrounds the issue of
stakeholder well-being, a concern which mandates exploration
under a Christian worldview of humanity.120
Traditional
Protestantism holds that socioeconomic well-being is best
achieved through indirect intention because, due to the effects of
original sin, the societal good that is a byproduct of the pursuit of
profits will be quantitatively superior to the common good

115 See Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 8. An externality is "the direct effect of the
actions of a person or firm on another person's well-being or a firm's production
capability rather than an indirect effect through changes in prices." JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MICROECONoMICS A-42 (2d ed. 2001).
116 See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123-24.
117 Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 11 (citing NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE

U.S. ECONOMY).
118 See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123.

119See id. (describing the Lutheran position that humankind is so fallen that it
is enslaved to its own selfishness).
120 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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achieved by the direct pursuit of universal well-being. 12 1 From a

traditional Protestant viewpoint, the shareholder value
maximization norm serves as the best mechanism to facilitate
this indirect intention.
Reconciling the norm with traditional Catholic thought is
difficult, but failure to do so may engender pragmatic obstacles.
Some argue that the Catholic position inadequately addresses an
empirical history of human behavior-specifically, the human
proclivity toward self-interest.
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge critiques the Catholic
approach of multipurpose motivation as more-or-less specious
and provides a Catholic viewpoint that includes a sound degree of
economic veracity. 122 One of his articles includes a discussion of
the impracticality of three forms of multi-constituent policy
(1) non-reviewable discretion for directors,
implementation:
(2) reviewable discretion for directors, and (3) judicial or
regulatory oversight of directors. 123 The first two are "toothless,"
according to Bainbridge, because they would permit directors and
officers to advance their own self-interests with impunity by
citing "nonshareholder interests" to justify their decisions when
124
such actions do not align with the interests of shareholders.
The real problem is that "[d]irectors who are responsible to
1 25
everyone are accountable to no one."

Bainbridge believes that the third implementation is
unworkable and arguably poses a basic threat to economic
liberty. Judges would face too many practical hurdles-including
balancing the infinite number of stakeholder interests,
maintaining consistency among the judicial collective, providing
directors and officers with adequate notice, and acquiring the
expertise necessary to become competent to adjudicate these
disputes. Bainbridge argues that "economic liberty to pursue
121 See discussion supra Part V.A.
122 See Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 5. Bainbridge says, "The Church tends to

be long on pious exhortations and short on detailed policy prescriptions." Id. at 6.
Others have argued that Catholic moral treatises have been unhelpful in dealing
with the practical problems of business ethics. See, e.g., id. n.17 (citing Scott
Fitzgibbon, "True Human Community . Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelian Ethics,
and the Moral Order of the Business Company, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1243, 1247-52
(2001)).
123 Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 16-20.
124 Id. at 17.
125 See id. at 23.
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wealth is an effective means of achieving a variety of moral
ends. '126 This Note humbly submits that it would not be wise to
chip away at a policy that has historically brought about
widespread prosperity and has served as an economic restraint
on socialistic governmental intrusion. Bainbridge, utilizing some
of Michael Novak's arguments, explains the connection between
economic freedom and personal liberty:
The corporation's freedom to pursue wealth for its
shareholders ... does more than just expand the economic pie
for investors. A legal system that permits the pursuit of wealth
maximization necessarily must allow individuals freedom to
pursue the accumulation of wealth. Economic liberty, in turn, is
a necessary concomitant of personal liberty-the two have
almost always marched hand in hand. The pursuit of wealth
has been a major factor in destroying arbitrary class
distinctions, moreover, by enhancing personal and social
mobility .... Because tyranny is far more likely to come from
the public sector than the private, those who for selfish reasons
strive to maintain both a democratic capitalist society and, of
particular relevance to the present argument, a substantial
sphere of economic liberty therein serve the public interest.
Concern for human freedom is wholly consistent with Catholic
social teaching.127
A Catholic worldview accepts that many people will operate
in their own self-interest. "[I]t is consistent with the Christian
world view to insist that a realistic social order must be designed
In
around principles that fall short of Christian ideals.
particular, the rules must not be defined in ways that effectively
require every citizen to be a practicing Christian."'128 Even the
Catholic understanding of the effect of original sin acknowledges
Bainbridge
a human tendency toward self-interest. 129
emphasizes that Christian ideals of justice are incapable of
constructing rules of economic order precisely because Christian
presuppositions insist that legal rules and predictions of human
130
behavior assume the fallen state of humankind.

126

127
128
129
130

Id. at 25.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 22.
See Koslowski, supra note 100, at 123.
Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 22.

218

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:195

Concern for humanity mandates an inquiry into how people
benefit or suffer from policy decisions. 13 1 The "direct intention"
approach advocated by the Catholic tradition is engaging, and
has much to contribute to this discussion. This Note concludes,
however, that the shareholder value maximization norm is more
compatible with a Christian worldview because the norm directly
addresses the critical Christian position of the human proclivity
toward self-interest, a reality held by both the Protestant and
Bainbridge cites a natural law
Catholic traditions.
nonconsequentialist 132 who acknowledged, "[o]ne must not waste
one's opportunities by using inefficient methods." 133 At times,
perhaps even nonconsequentialists find a cost-benefit analysis
irresistible, although-suffice it to say-not as the only
determining factor. 134 The potential for confusion, abuse, and
associated with multiple
problematic legal enforcement
constituencies is likely to do more harm than good to business,
and derivatively, socioeconomic well-being.
The shareholder value maximization norm satisfies the
ShareChristian understanding of financial accountability.
holders purchase stock in anticipation of future dividends and
stock prices increase; managers have long been employed to
facilitate these goals. In many instances, serving the interests of
other stakeholders will also increase profits for the shareholder.
Shareholders, however, should be given supreme consideration
by managers when their interests conflict with those of other
stakeholders.
Concededly, Enron showed that even under the tenure of the
shareholder value maximization norm, managers sometimes
engage in self-dealing. Corporate scandals like the fall of Enron
might serve not as an indication of the norm's inadequacy, but as
an example of what happens if the norm is not rigidly adhered to
Although managers
within the constraints of the law.
occasionally fail to follow the norm, it nonetheless serves the
purpose of clarity in a chaotic world of conflicting interests. Had
131

See discussion supra Part III.A.

132 Nonconsequentialists are a group of moral philosophers that believe moral

imperatives are duties that are generally sufficient in themselves to justify action.
Hale Chair in Applied Ethics, http://www.rit.edu/-692awww/resources/manuals
/dgaelpl0.html (last visited July 18, 2006).
133 Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 8 (citing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 111 (1980)).
134 Id.
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Enron made proper decisions in the context of shareholder value
maximization over an extended period, the scandal might not
have occurred. Consequently, the deferred compensation bank
run and widespread employee suffering might have been evaded.
This Note does not suggest that scandals are completely
avoidable through adherence to the norm. It plainly asserts that
notwithstanding some degree of inevitable corporate unrest, the
shareholder value maximization norm maintains its superior
position as the most efficient decision-making framework from
which widespread socio-economic prosperity may be derived, and
additionally, the norm is consistent with the reality that the
Christian religion posits.
CONCLUSION

Directors and managers should continue focusing their
efforts on shareholder value maximization. Christian teaching,
which mandates inquiry into the well-being of humanity, can be
used to reinforce this principle.
Differing opinions among
Christians regarding the shareholder value maximization norm
result from varying interpretations of the effects of original sin.
Notwithstanding these differences, both denominations recognize
a human proclivity toward self-interest. Therefore, regardless of
the denominational perspective adopted, proposed implementations of the multi-constituent approach are likely
inadequate or unworkable. The shareholder value maximization
norm will result in positive byproducts exceeding those
accomplished by a legal mandate to make monitored or
unmonitored decisions based upon the competing concerns of
multiple stakeholders.
Expanding the realm of mandated
considerations by directors and officers might potentially lead to
confusion or insincere business decisions with shifty allegiances,
and oversight could arguably infringe upon economic and
personal liberty. Although rigorous adherence to the norm will
not eliminate all corporate scandals, the norm continues to
maintain its position as the best business mechanism to achieve
socioeconomic well-being and it also comports with a Christian
worldview.

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

